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CONFUSING MEANS WITH ENDS: HOW THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CONTINUES THE TRADITION OF MISTAKING DIVERSITY AS
AN END IN PARENTS lNVOL VED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS V.
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT, No. 1

I. INTRODUCTION

"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of
a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to
the circumstances and the time in which it is used." 1 In his eloquent way,
Justice Holmes recognized that language is imperfect and changeable.
Despite the fluidity of words, the legal profession seeks stability in the law
by using words to create lasting rules. Unfortunately, judges are often
unable to create a clear, stable rule of law because of the fluctuating
nature of words and the changing circumstances that shape their
meaning.
Nowhere is this dilemma more prevalent than in cases involving race
and diversity, especially in education. In 1978, Justice Powell determined
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke2 that diversity in a
university setting was a compelling state interest. Since then, many
courts-including the Supreme Court itself-have struggled to define the
compelling state interest and determine how diversity plays a role in such
an interest. As epitomized in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No.1, 3 cases addressing compelling state interests
when using racial classifications have deteriorated from using diversity as
a means to a more compelling end to making diversity an end in itself.
This is detrimental because it bases law on jargon and distorts true goals.
After a recent decision to rehear the case, Parents is now pending before
an en bane court, and the Ninth Circuit once again has the opportunity
1. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418,425 (1918).
2. 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978).
3. 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Parents"), vacated, rehearing granted, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th
Cir. 2005). Note that this case has been addressed in federal court several times. See Parents Involved
in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (W.D. Wash 2001) ("Parents I'),
rev'd, 285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Parents If'), and rehearing granted, 294 F.3d 10845 (9th Cir.
2002) ("Parents IIf').
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establish a clear rule. 4
Parents is the first federal circuit case involving race classifications in
a school setting since the Supreme Court decisions in the University of
Michigan cases-Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger. 5 It is an
example of the analysis and decision that courts may reach in light of the
Supreme Court's most recent decisions. By studying Parents, we can see
the possible future of race classifications cases and the difficulties that
may be encountered in these cases.
This Note begins in Part II with a description of the facts
surrounding Parents. Part III describes the cases that create a background
for Parents, detailing tests used and outcomes reached in the Supreme
Court, Ninth Circuit, and other jurisdictions. Part IV discusses how the
Ninth Circuit confuses diversity as an end and why this is a mistake.
Finally, Part V provides a brief conclusion to this analysis.
II. FACTS IN PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS V. SEATTLE
SCHOOL DISTRICT, No. 1

Seattle School District, No. 1 (District) encompasses ten public high
schools that "vary widely in quality." 6 Though the District was never
legally segregated, without intervention of some kind "Seattle's racially
imbalanced housing patterns" would result in de facto segregation?
Thus, rather than using a simple geographic system to determine what
school a child will attend, the District created a system that allowed
parents to rank high schools in order of preference. If the parents' firstchoice school was full, the student would be placed in the second-choice
school unless that was also full. This process continued until each child
was assigned a school. 8
However, because of the great disparity in the quality of the schools,
some high schools were consistently over-requested, while others were
consistently under-requested. For example, during the 2000-2001 school
year, five of the schools were over-requested and five were underrequested.9 In order to resolve this problem, the District employed a
four-tier tiebreaker system. The first tiebreaker gave "preference to

4. Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 395 F. 3d 1168 (9th Cir.
2005) (deciding to rehear the case by an en bane panel of eleven judges).
5. Parents was first decided on July 27, 2004-approximatcly one year after Grutter, 539 U.S.
306 (2003), and Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), which were both decided on June 23,2003.

Parents, 377 F.3d at 954.
7. Id. at 954.
8. Id. at 955.
9. Id.

6.
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students with siblings already attending the requested school." 10 The
second tiebreaker was based solely on race. If a school had "fewer than
[thirty-one] percent or more than [fifty-one] percent white students, the
tiebreaker would operate." 11 Thus, if a school had only twenty percent
white students, the District would preferentially allow a white student
into that school. But if a school had sixty percent white students, the
District would then preferentially allow a non-white student into that
school. If the race tiebreaker did not solve the problem of an overrequested school, then the District used a distance tiebreaker that gave
preference to students living closer to the school. This tiebreaker usually
resolved the problem and the final tiebreaker of a random lottery was
rarely necessary. 12
The plaintiff in this case, Parents Involved in Community Schools
(PICS), is a group that formed in response to the District's use of the race
tiebreaker. The group claimed that the District's use of race as a factor in
determining enrollment violated state law, as well as the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 13
Both the District and PICS agreed on the general facts of the case and
both parties moved for summary judgment before the federal district
court. 14 The district court found for Seattle School District No. 1 on both
state and federal claims. 15 PICS appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and on
April 16, 2002 the circuit court reversed the district court's decision and
enjoined the Seattle School District from using the race tiebreaker. 16
However, the Ninth Circuit granted rehearing on the request of the
Seattle School District and then withdrew its previous decision and
vacated its injunction. 17 At the same time, the Ninth Circuit certified to
the Washington Supreme Court the question of whether the racial
tiebreaker violated Washington state law. 18 The state supreme court
heard arguments on this issue and determined that state law did not

10. !d.

II. !d. at 956 n. 6.
12. !d. at 956.
13. !d. The PJCS's state law claim came under the Washington Civil Right Act, otherwise
known as Initiative 200, which passed in 1998 and prohibited the government from giving
preferential treatment based on race. See john Burbank, Seattle Parents Exercise Right to Sue - and
Throw Schools Into Turmoil, The News Trib. (Tacoma, Wash.) (24, 2002) (available at http://www
.eoionl ine.org/N ews- Education-Taco maN ewsTribune042402.htm).
14. Parents, 377 F.3d at 957.
15. See Parents I, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, rev'd, Parents, 388 F.3d 949.
16. Parents, 377 F.3d at 957.
17. Parents, 377 f. 3d at 957 (citing Parents III, 294 F.3d at 1086).
18. Parents, 377 F.3d at 957 (citing Parents III, 294 F.3d at 1087).
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prohibit the District from using the race tiebreaker "so long as it remains
neutral on race and ethnicity and does not promote a less qualified
minority applicant over a more qualified applicant." 19 The Ninth Circuit
then heard argument on the federal questions. A week after the Ninth
Ciw1it panel released their decision regarding the federal questions, the
Seattle School District petitioned for an en bane hearing? 0 The petition
was granted and the case will be reheard three to six months after
February 1, 2005. 21
Clearly, therefore, this case continues to be a long and complex
battle. Not only is Parents the first circuit court case to be decided since
the Supreme Court issued its rulings in the University of Michigan
affirmative action cases, but the ultimate decision in this case remains
uncertain as the parties wait for the Circuit to congregate en bane and
rehear the case. As noted in the Parents dissent, the Supreme Court "has
never decided a case involving the consideration of race in a voluntarily
imposed school assignment program that is intended to promote
integrated secondary schools." 22 Thus, while the Ninth Circuit followed
the "guiding principles" of Supreme Court cases addressing similar
issues, 23 it had no direct guidance from the Court in making this
decision. As the first relevant circuit case to be decided since the Supreme
Court issued its rulings in the University of Michigan affirmative action
cases, 24 Parents potentially reflects how these Supreme Court cases may
affect lower courts' analysis of future diversity cases.
Ill. BACKGROUND CASE LAW
It is well-established precedent that any government function that
uses racial classifications must pass a strict scrutiny test for the function
to be upheld as constitutional. 2 s Strict scrutiny is divided into two issues.
First, the government must show it has a compelling state interest in
using the racial classification? 6 Second, the government must also show
that its use of race is narrowly tailored to '"assur[e] that [the government]

19. Parents, 377 F.3d at 9S7 (citing Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 72 P.3d 1Sl, 166 (Wash. 2003)).

20. Court to Review 'Racial Tiebreakers': Full 9th Circuit Takes Seattle Student Assignment
Case, Seattle Post~Intelligencer B2 (Feb. 2, 200S).
21. Id.
22. Parents, 377 F.3d at 989 (Graber dissenting).
23. Id.
24. These cases, Grutter, S39 U.S. 306, and Gratz, S39 U.S. 244, will be discussed in more
detail in the next section.
2S. See e.g. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, SIS U.S. 200,227 (199S).
26. Id.
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is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool."' 27 Although this seems to be a clear-cut and simple test, lower
courts often struggle in its application. For this reason, a brief history of
strict scrutiny cases illustrates not only why this test is actually quite
complex, but provides the context within which Parents arose.
In 1978, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether race
classifications could be used in admission policies for higher education
programs in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. 28 The
impact of this case on future decisions is significant, as shown by the fact
that it has been cited over 3,000 times in the past twenty-six years. 29
Interestingly, the justices of the Supreme Court filed six different
opinions for Bakke and, consequently, courts have disputed whether a
majority even existed in the decision. 30 Most courts cite Justice Powell's
opinion as the majority decision in the case. 31
Justice Powell determined that while the University of California was
likely attempting to achieve the compelling state interest of creating a
diverse student body, its method in doing so was not narrowly tailored
and thus failed the strict scrutiny test. Justice Powell stated more
specifically that the goal of achieving a diverse student body "clearly is a
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
education." 32 However, Justice Powell also noted that "[p ]referring
members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin
is discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids." 33
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun in their concurring
and dissenting opinion agreed that race classifications may be used by the
government, but only "so long as the use of race to achieve an integrated
student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of past
discrimination." 34 After this case, many courts assumed that diversity, by
itself, was a compelling state interest and that attempts to promote
diversity would therefore pass strict scrutiny as long as the method of

27. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (quoting Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 {1989)).
Of course, the highly suspect tool being referred to is race classification.
28. 438 U.S. 265.
29. As shown by Shepardizing the case on LexisNexis, it is cited in nearly 3,000 law reviews,
over 330 cases, and over 80 other sources (last Shepardized on October 4, 2004).
30. See e.g. S. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Metro. Dade
County, 723 F2d. 846,850 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Bakke ... did not produce a majority opinion.").
31. See e.g. Uzzell v. Friday, 591 F.2d 997, 998 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing justice Powell as the
writer of the majority opinion).
32. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-312.
33. Id. at 307 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 326 n. 1 (Brennn, White, Marshall & Blackmun, Jj., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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achieving this goal did not employ race quotas. 35
However, after the Bakke decision, members of the Supreme Court
determined in several cases that diversity alone is not a compelling state
interest. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 36 four justices of the
Supreme Court explicitly stated that "[m]odern equal protection doctrine
has recognized only one such [compelling state] interest: remedying the
effects of racial discrimination." 37 Likewise, the Court held in Freeman v.
Pitts, 38 a case addressing court -ordered school desegregation, that
"[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake. It is to be pursued
when racial imbalance has been caused by a constitutional violation." 39
In cases previous to Parents, the Ninth Circuit followed these
Supreme Court cases, holding that diversity alone is not a compelling
state interest. In Higgins v. Vallejo, the court determined that "a
government agency's [diversity] plan is valid only if the agency had a
compelling interest in remedying past discrimination." 40 In the 1991 case
Coral Construction Co. v. King, the court held that "[r]ace-based
classifications must be reserved strictly for remedial settings." 41 In the
more recent case, Ho v. San Francisco Unified School District, the Ninth
Circuit held that race "may still be employed if its use is found to be
necessary as the way of repairing injuries inflicted on persons because of
race." 42
Circuit courts have followed the above Supreme Court decision in
considering whether race or diversity is a compelling state interest. The
Tenth Circuit determined diversity alone is not a compelling interest. In
Cunico v. Pueblo School District No. 60, the court stated that the "purpose
of race-conscious affirmative action must be to remedy the effects of past
discrimination against a disadvantaged group that itself has been the
victim of discrimination." 43 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit held, in Cavalier
v. Caddo Parish School Board, that "[r]emedying the present effects of
past discrimination is a compelling interest that m particular
35. See e.g. Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256,274-75 (5th Cir. 2000).
36. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled, Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. 200, 225-27
(overruling Metro Broadcasting on grounds other than those discussed here).
37. Id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.)., Scalia & Kennedy, Jj., dissenting).
38. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
39. !d. at 494 (noting that "[o]nce the racial imbalance due to the de jure violation has been
remedied, the school district is under no duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by demographic
factors." Id. (citation omitted)).
40. 823 F.2d 351, 358 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Wygant v. jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 269
(1986)).
41. 941 F.2d 910,920 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Richmond, 488 U.S. at 493).
42. 147 F.3d 854, 864 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494).
43. 917 F.2d 431, 437 (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979);
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275; and Bakke, 438 U.S. at 300-01).
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circumstances may justify appropriate use of certain racial
classifications." 44 The court specifically noted that the parties must show
an interest beyond merely achieving a racial balance in order to satisfy
the strict scrutiny test. 45
In the recent University of Michigan cases, the Supreme Court
examined the practices of the university's law school admissions
program, in Grutter, 46 and its undergraduate admissions policy, in
Gratz. 47 In both Grutter and Gratz, the University of Michigan used race
as a factor in considering a candidate for admission. The Court made an
important distinction between the two cases in the "narrowly tailored"
prong of the strict scrutiny test: the law school used race as one of many
"soft" factors to consider in admissions, 48 while the undergraduate
program used a point system that awarded extra points for members of
underrepresented minority groups. 49 The Supreme Court upheld the law
school's program but held the undergraduate admissions program
unconstitutional. 50
In analyzing the "compelling interest" prong of strict scrutiny, the
Grutter Court referred to Bakke. The Court stated that "(c]ourts ... have
struggled to discern whether Justice Powell's diversity rationale [in
Bakke] is binding precedent. The Court finds it unnecessary to decide
this issue because the Court endorses Justice Powell's view that student
body diversity is a compelling state interest in the context of university
admissions." 51 Despite previous cases stating the contrary, the Court
claimed that "we have never held that the only governmental use of race
that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination." 52
IV. ANALYSIS

After examining the above line of cases it is easy to understand why
there is little consistency in strict scrutiny cases. The Supreme Court, the
Court whose decisions set precedent for all other courts in the nation, has

44. 403 F.3d 246, 250 (5th Cir. 2005).
45. I d. at 260 ("Racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake .... Once the racial
imbalance due to the de jure violation has been remedied, the school district is under no duty to
remedy imbalance that is caused by demographic factors.") (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,
493 (1992)).
46. 539

u.s. 306.

47. 539 U.S. 244.
48. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316.
49. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 254-56.
50. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275-76.
51. Grutter, 156 L. Ed. 2d 304,320-21 (emphasis added).
52. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
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often faltered in its analysis of the use of race. At times, the Court held
that racial diversity as a state goal may only be used to correct past
discrimination, but at other times, as recently as the Gratz and Grutter
cases of 2003, it held that the goal of racial diversity may have the
singular purpose of achieving diversity. The Ninth Circuit, in Parents,
continued the trend of mistaking diversity as an end in itself by allowing
diversity to serve as a compelling state interest.
In the context of Parents, it is valuable to analyze the difference
between what the government actor (Seattle School District No. 1)
considers a compelling state interest and what the circuit court's majority
and dissent considered a compelling state interest. Then finally, with
these views in mind, this analysis will examine why diversity should not
be an end, but rather a means to a higher end.
A. What Is Compelling?
1. What the Seattle School District Sees as Compelling

In seeking to justify the use of race classification, the Seattle School
District provided the court with an exhaustive list of what the District
deemed compelling state interests. These interests included:
[T]he educational benefits of attending a racially and ethnically diverse
school"; "integration of schools which ... would otherwise tend to
become racially isolated"; "ensuring that public institutions are open
and available to all segments of American society"; "alleviating de facto
segregation"; "increasing racial and cultural understanding"; "avoiding
racial isolation"; fostering "cross-racial friendships"; and "reduc[ing]
prejudice and increas[ing] understanding of cultural differences. 53

Many of these interests overlap and more than a few may have been
written for the sole purpose of embracing a statement that would help the
District's plan pass strict scrutiny. The "Statement Reaffirming [the]
Diversity Rationale" written by the District's School Board is more telling
of what the District hoped to achieve. The Statement reads in part:
Providing students the opportunity to attend schools with diverse
student enrollment also has inherent educational value .... Diversity
brings different viewpoints and experiences to classroom discussions
and thereby enhances the educational process ....
The District provides these opportunities for students to attend a
racially and ethnically diverse school . . . because it believes that
providing a diverse learning environment is educationally beneficial for

53. Parents, 377 F.3d at 961.
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all students. 54

This statement focuses on the goal of providing a higher quality
education through allowing interaction with a more diverse peer group.
Thus, the real goal of the District is not simply to allow a white child to
see a black child on a regular basis and in closer proximity. The goal
behind the interaction is to provide greater education for students of
every race.
The District is likely correct in asserting that education may certainly
be enhanced by a more diverse environment. It is a common conception
in the United States that it is important to have students of different races
in the same classroom. 55 The educational value, however, is not derived
simply from having diversity in the classroom. The value is found in both
allowing and even creating interaction that can be mind-opening and in
allowing access to good schools regardless of the race of the child. For
example, studies show that the majority of state schools with high
minority enrollment receive less funding than schools with low minority
enrollment. 56 Thus, if the goal is to allow children to receive a good
education, then creating schools with mixed-race enrollment may be one
method of achieving this goal because diversifying schools may help
increase the funding for a previously under-funded school.
2. What the Parents Majority Saw as Compelling

The majority in Parents adopted the "diversity rationale" provided by
the Supreme Court in Grutter. 57 The Parents majority explained that the
benefits of diversity "are as compelling in the high school context as they
are in higher education." 58 These benefits include "cross-racial
understanding," "break[ing] down of racial stereotypes," and livelier
classroom discussions. 59 In short, the majority recognized the "internal
educational and external societal benefits [that] flow from the presence of
racial and ethnic diversity in educational institutions."60
This language again illustrates the Ninth Circuit's misunderstanding
54. Id.

55. A study by Scripps Survey Research Center in February, 2004 found that sixty percent of
Americans polled believe it is "very important" and another twenty-eight percent believe it is
"somewhat important" that students of different races are in class together. Kenneth Jost, School
Desegregation: How Can the Promise of Equal Education Be Fulfilled? 14 The CQ Researcher 345,358
(April23, 2004).
56. I d. at 348. (citing Kevin Carey, The Funding Gap 2004: Many States Still Shortchange LowIncome and Minority Students, The Education Trust, (Oct. 19, 2003)).
57. Parents, 377 F.3d at 962-64.
58. Parents, 377 F.3d at 964.
59. Id. at 963 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).
60. I d. at 964.
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of what is a compelling interest and what is a means to reach that
interest. The interest, as stated by the majority, is in benefits such as
increased understanding, destruction of stereotypes, and enlightened
discussions. 61 Racial and ethnic diversity alone is not the interest, but
rather represents one method of meeting the real interests. Perhaps in
some cases this may be the only method of reaching such goals. Once
again however, the court failed to distinguish between the means and the
end-and by doing so the majority lacks clarity and misses the real goals.
3. What the Parents Dissent Saw as Compelling

The dissent in Parents, authored by Circuit Judge Graber, believed
that the District had a "compelling interest in the educational benefits of
racial diversity in secondary education" and "in reducing racial isolation
and ameliorating de facto segregation." 62 The dissent did not simply state
that diversity is a compelling interest. Rather, the dissent clearly defined
the compelling interests that may be met through the use of diversity.
The dissent recognized the importance of "identify[ing] precisely the
governmental interests-the ends-to which the government's use of
race must be fitted." 63
Further, the dissent explained that while the majority relied on
Grutter when claiming that diversity is a compelling interest, the
"compelling interest that the [Supreme] Court recognized in Grutter is
not 'diversity' per se but, rather, promotion of the specific educational
and societal benefits that flow from diversity." 64 Likewise, Justices
Thomas and Scalia, in their minority opinion in Grutter, agreed that
"[a]ttaining 'diversity,' whatever it means, is the mechanism by which
the ... [s]chool obtains educational benefits, not an end of itself." 65 The
dissent in Parents recognized the important distinction the majority
overlooked: diversity is valuable when used as a means to a higher end,
but is meaningless when used as an end unto itself.
B. Why Diversity Is a Means, Not an End
1. The Ill Effects of Confusing Ends with Means

A means is a "method, a course of action, or an instrument by which
61. Id. at 963
62. Parents, 377 F.3d at 991,993 (Graber dissenting) (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 990.
64. Id.
65. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 354-55 (Thomas & Scalia,
part).

JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
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an act can be accomplished or an end achieved." 66 An end is a result,
outcome, or goal. 67 The problems caused by confusing a means with an
end include: (1) using meaningless jargon as a rule of law, (2) creating a
circumstantial application of a rule of law, and (3) distorting true and
worthy goals.
a. The Meaningless Jargon Problem
First, allowing diversity to serve as a compelling state interest allows
meaningless jargon to become a rule of law. 68 Throughout Parents, the
Ninth Circuit hailed diversity as a legitimate state goal; however, the
court also recognized that the term "diversity" is often considered
"'amorphous,' 'abstract,' 'malleable,' and 'ill-defined."' 69 Justice Thomas
described the problem with the term 'diversity' in his opinion in Grutter:
'"[D]iversity,' for all of its devotees, is more a fashionable catchphrase
than it is a useful term, especially when something as serious as racial
discrimination is at issue.... I refer to [an interest in diversity] as an
'aesthetic."' 70
When a court creates a rule of law, it is essential that it is defined
with "precision" in order to avoid ambiguity. 71 Diversity, a loose term,
has no one meaning. For example, in Webster's 1913 Dictionary,
diversity is defined first as "A state of difference; dissimilitude;
unlikeness." 72 However, in a dictionary that is much more modern and
includes many colloquial definitions, diversity is defined as "variety or
multiformity." 73 These definitions show a subtle, but meaningful, shift in
society's meaning of diversity. In 1913, the definition emphasized the
differences caused by diversity. Today, the definition embraces diversity

66. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1086 (4th ed., Houghton
Mifflin 2000).
67. Id. at 589.
68. As one lawyer and educator commented on diversity: "Not many labels have been
productive of more confused thinking in our time than this one fdiversity] .... Diversity for its own
sake is meaningless and can clearly be shown to lead to unacceptable results." Dallin I-1. Oaks,
Address, Weightier Matters (Brigham Young U., Provo, Utah, Feb. 9, 1999) in jan. 2001 Ensign 13
(also available at http:/ /speeches.byu.edu/htmlfiles/OaksW99.html).
69. Parents, 377 F.3d at 962 (citations omitted).
70. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 354 n. 3 (Thomas & Scalia, ))., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
71. See id. at 354 (Thomas & Scalia, ))., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Here
) ustice Thomas explains his attempt to "define with precision the interest being asserted by the Law
School." !d.
72. Webster's
I 913
Dictionary,
http:/ /www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/diversity
(accessed Mar. 5, 2005).
73. Dictionary.com, http:/ /dictionary.reference.com/search?q=diversity (accessed Mar. 5,
2005).
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with a more positive focus on the creation of variations.
Judicial definitions of diversity have also shifted over time. In Bakke,
Justice Powell described diversity as a factor in creating a "heterogeneous
student body." 74 In recognizing the term "diversity" as ambiguous, the
majority in Parents noted an attempt to clarify the term by describing it
as "an educational institution's 'enroll[ment of] a critical mass of
minority students."' 75 These two ideas of diversity differ. Justice Powell
attempted to avoid the usual association of diversity with race. The court
in Parents, however, clearly noted that diversity often refers to
classification by race.
An interest that is compelling enough to justify the use of racial
classifications must constitute more than meaningless jargon. The Ninth
Circuit in Parents had an opportunity to clearly define what kind of
interest was sufficiently compelling. The court failed to do so. For
example, the court listed "diverse interactions," "educational diversity,"
and "racial and ethnic diversity" as interests?6 Each of these phrases
describes a unique interest, yet the court essentially used them
interchangeably. Further, the court provided no explanation as to what
these interests entail. It seems the court was satisfied to simply repeat
jargon rather than create a clear rule of law. With the pending en bane
hearing, the Ninth Circuit has the opportunity to correct these mistakes
and avoid adding problematic jargon to this important area oflaw.
b. The Circumstantial Application Problem
Second, because diversity is subject to a variety of definitions, when
diversity is used as an end alone, it allows for circumstantial application
of the law. This is particularly devastating in cases involving race because
it has long been held that race is the most suspect of all classifications. 77
The potential for circumstantial application of the diversity rationale is
especially evident in the Parents case. Parents arose in a high school
setting, while many other cases addressing the diversity rationale arose in
higher education settings. Because of the ambiguity of the term diversity,
it was easy for the District to claim that the diversity rationale, as

74. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
75. Parents, 377 F.3d at 963 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).
76. Id. at 964.
77. Justice Thomas explained that, "The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not
only because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but
also because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to
the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all." Grutter, 539 U.S at 353 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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employed in other cases, simply did not apply in a high school setting?8
A rule of law should be more stable and should not be subject to such
circumstantial application.
The circumstantial nature of diversity as an end is embodied in the
policy behind the District's racial tiebreaker: "Diversity brings different
viewpoints and experiences to classroom discussions and thereby
enhances the educational process." 79 This is a contextual argument. The
court discusses the argument that there is value in students having
"different-looking peers" in a school setting. 80 The supposed value here is
in preparing children for a diverse world. Is this same argument valid in a
work setting? Once the children are grown and are in the workplace,
does a justification exist for seeking diversity? Will the Ninth Circuit's
response change simply because the setting has changed?
One valid measure of the effectiveness of a rule of law is its clarity
and its applicability to a variety of contexts. By this measure the rule that
diversity is a compelling state interest, as first established by Justice
Powell in Bakke and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Parents, is not
effective. The application of the rule that diversity is a compelling state
interest is convoluted even within decisions-such as Parents-that
uphold the rule. For example, the majority in Parents first explained that
the diversity rationale has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court and
that the Ninth Circuit will thus sanction it as well. 81 However, the
majority went on to state that the actions of the District "represent[ ] a
stubborn adherence to the use of race for race's sake, with the effect that
some non-preferred student applicants will be displaced solely because of
their racial and ethnic identities-to no benefit at all." 82 Thus, one must
question what rule the Ninth Circuit was really upholding in Parents.
Even as the court purported to allow diversity for diversity's sake as a
compelling state interest, it also claimed that the state cannot use race for
race's sake. The difference, if any, between a state's interest in diversity
and its interest in race is ambiguous and open to interpretation that
would lead to vastly different results in different situations and by
different courts.

78. The District asserted that, "'[T]he Michigan decisions have meaning only in the context of
[college] admissions .... [The] argument that race may be considered [only] in a holistic
individualized review as one factor among many contributing to diversity is not applicable to [high
schools]."' Parents, 377 F.3d at 976.
79. Id. at 961 (quoting the School Board's "Statement Reaffirming Diversity Rationale").
80. Id. at 986 (suggesting this argument is the dissent's characterization of the District's
argument).
81. Id. at 962.
82. Id. at 975.
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c. The Distortion Problem

Third, the use of diversity as an end rather than a mean distorts the
more worthy and important compelling state interests. Holding that
diversity is a compelling end puts the complete focus on racial and ethnic
differences. With all of the focus on these differences, any other
important consideration is distorted. This principle is best illustrated by
examining the methods of photography. If one focuses a camera on one
object alone, all other objects become a blur in the background. In order
to see an entire scene clearly, one must step back from the single object
and allow the camera to focus on more elements. Likewise, one must step
back from a singular focus on diversity in order to see other elements
that may be of equal or even greater importance than diversity alone.
This distortion is seen in Smith v. University of Washington as the
Ninth Circuit contradicted itself by treating diversity as both a means
and an end. 83 The court first stated that diversity alone is a compelling
state interest. 84 Later in the opinion, however, the court stated that the
interest lies in the "educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
body." 85 This treatment creates confusion as the court's focus shifts from
the true goal to what is confused for a goal (but is actually a means to a
different end). Confusing this point leads the court to focus on diversity
rather than the educational benefits that are sought. The goal is out of
focus. Other means to reaching this goal are likewise out of focus.
This confusion and lack of proper focus does not mean the court was
completely wrong. Research shows that diversity has positive educational
effects. 86 Empirical evidence "consistently demonstrates that a diverse
87
However, this
student body adds value to the educational process."
does not suggest that diversity is the only way to achieve such value or
that only one type of diversity adds value. Therefore, courts must be clear

83. Smith, 392 F.3d 367, 369, 371 (9th Cir. 2004).
84. Id. at 369-70.
85. Id. at 371.
86. See jeffrey F. Mil em, The Educational Benefits of Diversity: Evidence from Multiple Sectors,
in Compelling Interest: Examining the Evidence on Racial Dynamics in Colleges and Universities 126,
126-30 (Mitchell ). Chang et al. eds., Stanford U. Press 2003). This text addresses diversity within
university settings; however, the analysis can be applied to high school education as well.
87. Daria Witt, Mitchell ). Chang & Kenji Hakuta, Introduction, in Compelling Interest:
Examining the Evidence on Racial Dynamics in Colleges and Universities 1, 2; but see Thomas E.
Wood & Malcolm ). Sherman, Race and Higher Education: Why Justice Powell's Diversity Rationale
for Racial Preferences in Higher Education Must Be Rejected 65, http://www.nas.org/rhe.pdf (accessed
Mar. 9, 2005) (quoting California Association of Scholars, Accreditation and Diversity: A Critique of
WASC's "Draft Report on Diversity" 30 (1993)) ("'n a number of crucial areas, the study fails to
provide the expected evidence that diversity and excellence are positively correlated, and in some
areas it actually provides evidence that they may be negatively correlated.").
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on this point: states have a compelling interest in seeking a more valuable
educational process. Diversity for its own sake is not a compelling
interest, but the means to achieving educational value.
2. Why Diversity Should Be Viewed as a Means

Quite simply, no purpose is served by diversity alone. Diversity for
diversity's sake is futile-and may even be harmful. Even courts that hold
diversity is a compelling state interest haverecognized this. 88 Diversity
must be viewed as a means in order to recognize important goals and ·
prevent tunnel vision when creating solutions.
First, courts must recognize truly compelling state interests, or end
goals, in order to solve problems in public education. For example, as
previously noted, there is an incredible disparity in funding for public
high schools. 89 School districts with a high percentage of minority
students often receive less funding than schools with a high percentage of
white students. 90 If courts were to address this problem, the appropriate
goal would be to increase educational opportunities through more equal
funding. However, if a court viewed diversity as the only useful
compelling interest, the goal of creating equal funding for adequate
education would be lost in the search for diversity alone.
Therefore, focusing on racial diversity alone may also create tunnel
vision that does not explore other possible means to reaching a goal or
consider other types of diversity that may be valuable. Again, if the goal is
to provide equal funding, one potential method to reach this goal may be
through increased diversity. However, because most public schools are
funded through property tax, schools may need increased economic
diversity, rather than racial diversity, in order to reach a goal of equal
funding. Thus, by acknowledging the real goal of equal funding, one may
better understand the best method to obtain this goal.
In another situation, the goal may be to enhance students'
educational experiences. Diversity may be a means to reaching this goal.
However, diversity may not be the only method of enhancing education.
New curriculum, better equipment, or better teachers may be equal or
even better methods of enhancing education. In any case, distinguishing
the actual goal from potential methods of achieving that goal also enables
one to discover more possible solutions.
One lawyer and educator describes the harm that can result from
88. The majority in Parents chastised the District's program for using "race for race's sake."
Parents, 377 F.3d at 975. At the same time, however, the majority allows diversity for diversity's sake
to pass as a compelling state interest. Id. at 964.
89. Jost, supra n. 53, at 3.
90. Id. This funding gap can be as large as $1,000 per student. Id.
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focusing solely on diversity without distinguishing the true goals from
the methods employed to reach those goals:
Diversity for its own sake is meaningless and can clearly be shown to
lead to unacceptable results. For example, if diversity is the underlying
goal for a neighborhood, does this mean we should seek to assure that
the neighborhood includes thieves and pedophiles, slaughterhouses and
water hazards? Diversity can be a good method to achieve some longterm goal, but public policy discussions need to get beyond the slogan
to identify the goal, to specify the proposed diversity, and to explain
how this kind of diversity will help to achieve the agreed-upon goal. 91

The pursuit of diversity for its own sake is meaningless. Courts must
look beyond diversity to discover meaningful goals and find solutions
that best meet such goals.
V. CONCLUSION
"In absence of clearly defined goals, we become strangely loyal to
performing acts of ... trivia." 92 In Parents, the Ninth Circuit was given
the opportunity to delineate what goal constitutes a compelling state
interest when a school district seeks to increase the diversity of its high
schools. Rather than recognizing the real educational goals of the
District, the court identified diversity alone as a compelling state interest,
thus trivializing the interest. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit continued the
trend of confusing ends with means. Fortunately, this case will soon be
reheard before the court in an en bane hearing, and the Ninth Circuit will
have the opportunity to correct its course. To avoid repeating its mistake,
the Ninth Circuit should unambiguously recognize that while diversity
may be a method of reaching important social and educational goals,
diversity alone is not a sufficient goal.
Maria Funk Miles

91. Oaks, supra n. 69 (emphasis added).
92. The Quotations
December 30, 2004).
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